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TH E U.N.
SECURITY

Are there
c OUN c I Lchecks
to provide
balance
The revival of the Security
Council has come with a price:
its new found power has been
accompanied by questions about
the council's continuing
legitimacy. Calls for restructuring
the membership of the council
now are coming both from states
with a presumptive interest in
maintaining the status quo, such
- BY JosE E. ALVAREZ
as the United States, as well as
This is the text of a from states which do not have
speech delivered to the either permanent membership or
Council on Foreign Relations, the veto. 1 Thus the Clinton
in Washington, D.C. in Administration has now officially
November 1993. endorsed the idea that Germany
and Japan be given permanent
council membership.
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It is not hard to understand why this
topic is au courant: at the same time that
the end of the Cold War ended the
council's stagnation, it also marked the
end of the consensus on which members
ought to be entitled to permanent
membership and/or the veto. As Tom
Franck suggested in his recent book, The

Power of Legitimacy Among Nations
(1990), the special voting privileges
originally given to the Permanent Five,
though inconsistent with the charter
principle of sovereign equality, were
justified because the United States, the
United Kingdom, France, China, and the
USSR were (at least for most of the Cold
War) plausibly those most responsible for
world security. Today, as Franck notes,
Britain, France, and China are "middle
powers" economically inferior to Germany and] apan, both of whom have
greater potential for a larger institutional
role in maintaining the peace.
DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT

Demands for greater "democratization"
within the UN comparable to the democratization increasingly evident amongst
member states have encouraged proposals to expand the council membership
and/or the veto to include Germany and
Japan, as well as Third World representatives such as India, Nigeria or Brazil.
Such expansion proposals are grounded
in the assumption that potentially the
most powerful organ in the world should
reflect the views of a considerable portion
of the world's population, including the
views of the less industrialized ·nations. 2
In this realpolitik view of legitimacy, it is
assumed that a council which more
accurately reflects the real powers and
competing concerns in the world facilitates enforcement of its decisions and
may even secure more timely payments
of peacekeeping and other necessary
assessments.

The threat to the legitimacy of the
council is, however, more fundamental
and more intractable than these proposals would suggest, in at least two respects. First, the United States needs to
address demands that the UN ameliorate
the "democratic deficit" through the most
obvious mechanism: by increasing the
involvement of the General Assembly.
One can scarcely ask for a more "representative" group than the General
Assembly, and the United States is hardly
in a position to complain about proposals
to increase the General Assembly's role
with respect to peace and security. It was,
after all, the United States which, near
the beginning of the Cold War, helped to
redefine the role of the General Assembly
with respect to these issues through the
Uniting for Peace Resolution, under
which the assembly can authorize a
peace-keeping mission whenever the
council fails to take action.3 The United
States helped convince the membership
then that the council's "primary" responsibility for international peace and
security did not confer on it "exclusive"
power, 4 so today the United States must
be prepared to cope with the institutional
precedent it helped establish. Today,
though conditions for invoking that
resolution appear remote, a stalemate
within the council may yet trigger an
attempt to do so.
More palatable to the United States
may be Professor W. Michael Reisman's
suggestion that the council encourage the
formation of a "Chapter VII Consultation
Committee" of twenty-one members of
the Assembly.5 Under Reisman's proposal, the council would immediately
notify this committee whenever it
planned to move into a Chapter VII
mode. The Secretary-General and the
President of the council would promptly
meet with the committee to share
information and solicit its views.
Throughout the crisis, the council and
committee would remain in constant
contact in the best tradition of "consulta-

tion" as understood in international law
and practice. The assembly would not
have a veto over council action, but at the
same time its participation would extend
beyond a right to mere notification. Such
institutionalized give-and-take would
facilitate a greater sense of participation
and endow final council decisions with
the imprimatur, the legitimacy, of the
larger world community. (Any similarities with, for example, joint Congressional/Executive consultations under
the War Powers Act are presumably
intentional.)
Along with such formalized procedures, or possibly in place of them, any
number of other changes to the present
council's overly secretive "informal
consultations" can be envisaged to
expand the sense of participation. At a
minimum, some members have suggested that states particularly affected by
the imposition of economic sanctions or
states which would be expected to
contribute troops to a contemplated
mission should be invited to council
deliberations before decisions are made
- even when these states are not council
members. Others have suggested more
modest reforms. One is that the council
take more seriously its duty to report to
the assembly- i.e., that such reports be
more timely and include substantive
discussions of the issues, something more
than a mere list of council decisions.

2
3

4
5

See e.g., Statement by Ambassador Madeleine K.
Albright before the Foreign Policy Association,
New York City, USUN Press Release 89-(93),
June 8, 1993, at 5. For the many restructuring
proposals by other states, see responses made in
response to the Secretary-General's request in
"Question of Equitable Representation on and
Increase in the Membership of the Security
Council," Report of the Secretary-General, N48/
264 and additions thereto.
See report of the General-Secretary, supra note 1.
UN G.A. Res. 337A (V 1950), adopted
November 3, 1950.
Compare Articles 24 and 12 of the UN Charter.
W . Michael Reisman, 'The Constitutional Crisis
in the United Nations," 87 Amer. ]our. Int'! L.
83, at 99 (1993).
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COUNCIL 'LAW-MAKING'

The law's need for
consistency and
impartiality raises other
doubts as well. Is every
state accused by a
permanent member of
international terrorism
now subject to council
sanction? If not, is the
council only applying
and creating a rule as
against an outlaw regime
under the pretext of an
existing "threat to the
.
. 1peace"?.
mternat1ona
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The second and more difficult problem for the council is that some of the
legitimacy concerns have nothing to do
with representation on the council, the
veto power as such, or the degree of
openness of its procedures. Some of the
disquiet surrounding recent council
action stems from the substantive content
of its decisions. Many are troubled
because the council is sometimes acting
as a judicial and a law-making body
without the traditional attributes of
either. A few examples will illustrate
the point.
First, consider measures imposed on
post-Gulf War Iraq under Council
Resolutions 686, 687, and beyond.
Under these continuing sanctions, Iraqi
sovereignty has been put, in effect, under
receivership. For the first time, the UN
has told a supposedly sovereign state
what its borders are supposed to be,
what proportion of its export earnings it
is entitled to keep, what financial liability
it has now incurred, ·~hat kinds of
observers it must admit into its most
sensitive areas, what types of weapons it
may possess, and even what
treaties it must ratify.
These determinations have been
imposed as if by a legislature or a
court, subject to no time
constraint; indeed, some of them,

such as with respect to boundaries, are
presumably to apply in perpetuity. One
need not be a friend of Iraq to wonder
whether these resolutions are really
justified by an existing threat to the
international peace or whether they are
designed to bring down a particular
regime - perhaps in pursuit of publicly
stated U.S. foreign policy goals (i.e, to
stifle a powerful regional enemy of
democracy, encourage nuclear nonproliferation, and secure regional
stability). 6
Others may question aspects of these
decisions on moral or humanitarian
grounds. Should the people of Iraq suffer
- perhaps in perpetuity or until the
council decides the Gulf War debt has
been paid? The doubts are only heightened by the suspicion that unlike a
legislature or court, the council has not
established clear rules of general applicability on when comparable actions will be
taken on other culprits. Certainly the
council has not visited such a plight on
all those who have violated the charter.
Second, consider council Resolution
748, which imposed economic and other
sanctions on Libya to force it to extradite
two Libyans accused of masterminding
the Lockerbie bombing. Resolution 748,
adopted March 31, 1992, cut air links
with Libya, prohibited arms-related
material, advice, or assistance, reduced
the level of Libyan diplomatic representa-

tion, closed down all Libyan Arab
Airlines offices, and allowed the expulsion or denial of entry to Libyans accused
of international terrorism - all because
Libya had not complied with Resolution
731 of January 21, 1992, which called
upon Libya to cooperate fully with
requests concerning acts of terrorism.
The council acted while Libya's
complaint against the legality of compelled extradition was being heard by the
World Court. Libya argued that under
relevant treaty law, it has the right to
extradite or prosecute and that, at a
minimum, it has the right to have its
nationals tried by an impartial international body rather than courts in the
United States or Scotland. Once the
council had acted under Chapter VII,
however, the Court dismissed Libya's
request for provisional relief. 7 While
Libya may yet comply with the council's
demands and its case may never proceed
to the merits, the legal doubts remain.
Not all UN members are comfortable
with the precedent that the council,
without benefit of trial, can compel any
state to tum over any national to another
state on the basis of that other state's
mere allegations of wrongdoing, without
any specific warrant in existing treaties
between requesting and requested state.
The law's need for consistency and
impartiality raises other doubts as well.
ls every state accused by a permanent
member of international terrorism now
subject to council sanction? If not, is the
council only applying and creating a rule
as against an outlaw regime under the
pretext of an existing "threat to the
international peace"? In addition, the
tools available to the council under
Chapter VII - essentially sancti_ons or
use of force - seem both too blunt and
too weak, and ill-suited to the remedy
sought. On the one hand, broad economic sanctions which may prove
extremely costly to the economies of
innocent third parties not responsible for
Libya's defiance seem an awfully blunt
instrument to compel a small ministerial

act: the turning over of two individuals.
On the other hand, how serious can the
council be as an enforcer if it refrains
from the one type of sanctions - a ban
on oil imports from Libya - most likely
to prove effective?

A

TROUBLING TRIBUNAL

Finally, consider certain council
actions with respect to BosniaHerzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro.
The council has, as part of its peacemaking effort, authorized the establishment of an international tribunal to
prosecute persons responsible for war
crimes in the former Yugoslavia. 8 Although intended to reaffirm the
Nuremberg Principles, this tribunal is
unprecedented because it is not created
by treaty, as was Nuremberg, but by the
council, acting under Chapter VII. The
tribunal and its statute, although widely
praised, has prompted some timid
questions from an American Bar Association Special Task Fore~ U.N. Ambassador Madeleine K. Albright, and others.
Was it ever really intended that the
council be authorized to create a standing
international court capable of trying and
convicting individuals? Will the hastily
conceived tribunal now be regarded as a
precedent for a permanent international
criminal court which many have sought
for so long? If this is the case, we should
look at the statute of this tribunal
especially carefully, because it does not
always respect the rights of the criminal
defendant in ways consistent with
international human rights norms or
national constitutions, including our
own. For example, the tribunal is left to
resolve important issues essential to the
due process rights of defendants and its
own legitimacy. Its hastily drafted statute
deals inadequately with such basic
human rights as the right of confrontation, the right to counsel, and the right
against double jeopardy.
Moreover, the crimes over which the
tribunal has jurisdiction reflect the UN's
confusion over the nature of the dispute
in the former Yugoslavia. The new war
crimes tribunal departs from the judgment at Nuremberg in one significant
respect: the tribunal has no jurisdiction
to try persons for the waging of aggres-

sive war. Yet the judges at Nuremberg
specifically found such charges to be the
linchpin for all convictions. 9 The omission is probably due to the UN's hesitation in branding the conflict in the
former Yugoslavia as something other
than a civil war. Notwithstanding the
admission of Bosnia and Herzegovina to
UN membership, the UN has not made
up its mind about whether the war in
that region is a civil war or an act of
aggression against a sovereign state. This
equivocation is understandable at the
political level but may wreak havoc with
the legal goals which inspired the
creation of the tribunal. It was established to buttress existing laws of war
and of human rights, to confirm to the
world that such rights are well-established under customary international law
and are applicable to all, whether or not
they are parties to relevant treaties.
Instead, the tribunal departs from
Nuremberg precedent, withholds condemnation of possibly the gravest
violation of the laws of war, and may yet
undermine the human rights of defendants brought before it. Such doubts
invite criticism that the tribunal exists
merely to soothe the consciences of those
lacking the political will to deal more
directly with the atrocities in Bosnia.
DOING TOO MUCH, TOO QUICKLY

In each of these three instances we
entertain these admittedly legalistic
doubts because the council, when it acts
under Chapter VII, is authorized to make
binding law which can be invoked on
6

7

8
9

10

See, e.g., Remarks of Anthony Lake, Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs, at
johns Hopkins University, September 21, 1993
(citing these as part of U.S. foreign policy goals).
Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and
Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention
Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie,
Interim Measures Order, April 14, 1992, 1992
!CJ Rep. 114.
S/RES/827, adopted May 25, 1993.
judgment of the International Military Tribunal,
Nuremberg, Germany, 1946, 22 I.M.T., Trial of
the Major War Criminals, 411, 427 (1948).
See, e.g., Franck, The Power of Legitimacy
Among Nations (1990).
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If at least some of the
doubts we now entertain
about the council are due
to its tendency to assume
a broader quasi-judicial or
legislative role than is
warranted by the existing
threat to the peace, there
are ways to defuse these
doubts. The council
cannot and should not
avoid taking legally
binding decisions. This is
part of its job.
It can, however,
consciously exercise some
normative restraint.
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members and non-members of the UN
alike. (See UN Charter, Articles 2(7), 25,
41, and 48.) The council also purports
to act in a law-making or judicial manner. Council decisions "determine" that
Iraq, Libya, and Serbia and Montenegro
have violated international law in specific
ways, invoke treaty authority to render
judgment, and invite us to judge the
council as if it were a court or legislature.
We are encouraged to judge the council's
actions - which after all constitute
precedents for the interpretation of the
Charter - in the same way we judge all
laws: by their textual clarity, coherency
with other rules of general application,
the match between deed and sanction,
and the impartiality of application. 10
Much of the criticism directed at the
council of late seems to suggest that it is
doing too little, too late - as with
respect to Bosnia. Yet in the long run, the
greater problem may be that at times it is
undertaking too much, too quickly not only because what it is doing is
exceeding its operarlve capabilities but
because it is trying to accomplish what
others might do better, albeit more
slowly.
Today the council sometimes goes
beyond the immediate need to defuse a
threat to the international peace and
security. At times it is attempting to
adjudicate legal disputes and impose
long-term legal solutions (as with Iraq on
weapons and boundaries); trying to alter
(or progressively develop) established law
(as with the regime to "extradite or
prosecute" terrorists); or trying to apply
principles of international law much as
the World Court would (as for war
crimes). Nothing in the charter, of
course, precludes any of this.
Indeed, back in 1945, the United
States argued that the council has two
functions: the "political function" of

taking enforcement action and a "quasijudicial" function of settling disputes. It
argued that the veto applied only to the
first type of action and that every nation
"large or small" should abstain from
voting on disputes to which it was a
party. 11 Although the United States's
promise not to deploy its veto and to
abstain pretty much died with the Cold
War, the premise that the Security
Council can successfully carry out this
dual role is with us yet again.
Revival of the anti-veto/abstention
promise might yet make the council's
claim to 'quasi-judicial' status credible,
but this is dubious. The council is
preeminently a reactive, political forum
apt to act on the basis of short-term
needs, not long term judicious (or
judicial) perspective. Council representatives do not necessarily consider the
broader legal consequences of what they
do. And this is as it probably must and
should be, since the enforcer of the
international peace must be political.
A decision to act or to refuse to act in a
case like Bosnia needs to consider factors
other than the establishment of legal
precedent pleasing to law professors.
And no amount of tinkering in its
membership is likely to tum the council
into an impartial court or a deliberative
"law-making" body like the International
Law Commission. (As the World Court
noted when it approved the assembly's
creation of an administrative tribunal to
deal with UN employee complaints, the
assembly had little choice, since a
deliberative political body can hardly be
expected to act in a judicial capacity. 12)
In fact, if the United States Senate and
Senator Packwood are any indication,
even a real legislature has trouble assuming the role of a court.
Yet, if at least some of the doubts we
now entertain about the council are due
to its tendency to assume a broader
quasi-judicial or legislative role than is
warranted by the existing threat to the
peace, there are ways to defuse these
doubts. The council cannot and should
not avoid taking legally binding decisions. This is part of its job. It can,
however, consciously exercise some
normative restraint.

Nothing precluded the council from,
mine the entire organization. Libya's
for example, requiring Iraq and Kuwait to · challenge to the actions of the United
States and the United Kingdom in pursuit
settle their boundary and treaty interpreof the council's sanctions, the subject of a
tation through submission to the World
provisional measures opinion in the IC]
Court or arbitration; the council could
also have accepted the possibility of an
now being heard on the merits, already
international forum for the trial of the
has tempted individual judges on that
accused Libyans in which Libya's claims
court into saying (however obliquely)
based on the Montreal Convention also
that the council is either violating
would have been aired. The council
international law or acting ultra vires. 14
could have included "sunset" provisions
Similarly, Bosnia's moving plea before
or disclaimers on certain of its actions to
the IC] for the lifting of the council's
arms embargo, however resolved by the
limit the legal effect to the crisis at hand.
For example, a determination that the
court, 15 puts the council potentially at
odds with the inherent right of selfneed to continue weapons inspections in
defense - to the discredit of the council,
Iraq would be re-examined either by the
the organization, and international law.
council or by some impartial body in five
years' time would have shown council
Anticipating, encouraging, and accepting
acceptance of some limits to its power
the assistance of the Court on those
and helped to distinguish its actions from issues appropriate for judicial resolution
those of a court or a general law-making
would reduce the likelihood of such
embarrassing spectacles before the Court
body. Rather than delegate to the Secreand be in the long-term interest of the
tary General the drafting of a rushed
Court, the council, and the rule of law.
statute for a new war crimes tribunal for
Bosnia, it might have turned to UN factFrom a Western lawyer's perspective,
finding processes such as an El Salvadorthe council's current dHemma is predictstyle 'Truth Commission." Such an
able. A charter which puts at its helm
approach might have mobilized shame
unreviewable political authority with no
against war criminals pending the
competing political or judicial check may
creation of an International Criminal
indeed be a workable system but it is not,
Tribunal through a more deliberative
as Professor Reisman has suggested, a
process or pending results in the greater
constitution worthy of the name.16 Yet if
there is to be a "New World Order" based
peace process.
At the risk of being labelled what
on the rule of law, it is difficult to see
Reisman calls a "judicial romantic, 13
how that world can come about except
I would also suggest that some of these
through some approximation of such a
legitimacy concerns might also be met by constitutional system.
greater recourse to the World Court In its stead, the council is flexing its
particularly when it is foreseeable that
legal muscles, and no other entity council actions would otherwise be
certainly not the General Assembly and
subject to challenges in that Court or
not the World Court- has yet emerged
elsewhere. Even back in 1945, when the
as an acceptable check or balance on
United States (perhaps naively) believed
council action. No organ exists which can
that the council could act in a quasicall the council to account under the rule
judicial capacity, the United States
of law to protect the interests of memstressed that legal aspects of disputes
bers, or to protect other persons with no
should be referred to the Court for advice voting power, or to protect the long term
(as is contemplated by article 36(3) of
interests of law itself. The result is fear the Charter).
fear that power which is accountable to
Current challenges to the council's
no one is only coincidentally power
actions now pending before the World
pursuant to law and fear that any peace
Court may prompt the council to reconachieved at the expense of the rule of law
sider its role vis-a-vis the court. Othermay be short-lived. Reducing these fears
wise, a crisis looms which may underwill require something more than the
admission of Germany and Japan to
the council.

Professor Alvarez teaches international
law, international organizations,
international legal theory and foreign
investment law.
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See, e.g., Franck, The Power of Legitimacy
Among Nations (1990).
Statement by the Secretary of State, Mar. 5,
1945, XII Bulletin, Department of State, No.
298, Mar. 11, 1945, at 395-97.
Should the General Assembly contemplate, for
dealing with future disputes, the making of some
provision for the review of awards of the
Tribunal, the Court is of the opinion that the
General Assembly itself, in view of its
composition and functions , could hardly act as a
judicial organ - considering the arguments of
the parties, appraising the evidence produced by
them, establishing the facts and declaring the law
applicable to them - all the more so as one
party to the dispute is the United Nations
Organization itself.
Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the
United Nations Administrative Tribunal , 1954
!CJ Rep. 47, at 56.
CL Reisman, supra note 5, at 94.
Lockerbie Case, supra note 7, Separate Opinion
of Judge Shahabuddeen and Dissenting Opinions
of Judges Bedjaoui, Weeramantry, Ajibola, and
El-Kosheri.
See Case Concerning Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro)), 1993 !CJ Rep. (Order on
Provisional Measures).
Reisman, supra note 5, at 95 .
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